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Abstract
Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning is the sole or even
primary means by which moral judgments are made. Rather, intuitionist models posit that certain situations automatically
elicit moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments. We present three experiments showing that evaluations are also
susceptible to the influence of moral versus non-moral construal. We had participants make moral evaluations (rating
whether actions were morally good or bad) or non-moral evaluations (rating whether actions were pragmatically or
hedonically good or bad) of a wide variety of actions. As predicted, moral evaluations were faster, more extreme, and more
strongly associated with universal prescriptions—the belief that absolutely nobody or everybody should engage in an
action—than non-moral (pragmatic or hedonic) evaluations of the same actions. Further, we show that people are capable
of flexibly shifting from moral to non-moral evaluations on a trial-by-trial basis. Taken together, these experiments provide
evidence that moral versus non-moral construal has an important influence on evaluation and suggests that effects of
construal are highly flexible. We discuss the implications of these experiments for models of moral judgment and decision-
making.
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Introduction
Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have
challenged the view that moral reasoning is the sole or even
primary means by which moral judgments are made. Rather,
intuitionist models posit that certain situations automatically elicit
moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments [1]. According to
these models, moral judgments are very often produced by
reflexive mental computations that are unconscious, fast, and
automatic [2]. From this perspective, affective responses are
automatically triggered by certain moral issues and provide a
strong bottom-up influence on judgments and decision-making. As
such, the role of moral reasoning is relegated to the role of post hoc
justification [1] or corrective control following the initial intuition
[3], but is not the causal impetus for a moral judgment. In the
current paper, we present three experiments showing that moral
evaluations are also susceptible to construal. Specifically, we show
that people can deliberately construe a wide variety of actions
through either a moral or a non-moral lens with different
consequences for their evaluations.
The Origins of Moral Intuitions
Dating back to Darwin [4], several theorists have proposed that
evolution may have provided humans with a built-in set of moral
rules, heuristics or intuitions [5,6,7,8,9]. In addition, moral beliefs
and values can develop through social learning, via which children
learn specific cultural practices [1,10] and ultimately acquire a set
of knowledge structures about moral standards that guide their
social interactions and provide the foundation for morality in
adulthood [11]. The conversion of preferences into values—
termed moralization—often occurs in cultures and individuals on
the scale of years and involves an increased overlap between values
and a personally or socially important issue or action [12,13].
The work on the biological and cultural basis of morality has
inspired a highly influential approach to moral psychology—the
intuitionist model. The intuitionist model of moral judgment
focuses on evaluations ‘‘that are made with respect to a set of
virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture’’ [1] This
definition is broad enough to allow ‘‘marginally moral judgments’’
that may have escaped the attention of moral philosophers but are
nevertheless moralized in the local cultural milieu (e.g., eating a
low fat diet). Whereas, rationalist approaches hold that moral
judgments are reached through a process of reasoning and
reflection [14,15,16], the intuitionist approach argues that eliciting
situations automatically trigger affective moral intuitions, which
guide moral judgments [1]. According to the intuitionist model,
conscious reasoning frequently follows an initial judgment,
providing a post hoc justification but not the causal impetus.
For instance, Haidt and colleagues [17] have created scenarios
to which people typically have strong moral reactions but fail to
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articulate any rational principles to justify their responses—a
response termed ‘moral dumbfounding’. Likewise, there is now
extensive experimental evidence that disgust and other emotional
responses influence moral judgments [18,19]. From the intuitionist
perspective, unconscious, affective responses guide reactions to
these morally charged scenarios and people often engage in
deliberate reasoning only after they have already made an initial
moral judgment.
Despite the popularity of the bottom-up approach to morality
posited by the intuitionist model, several theorists have argued that
an appraisal process [20] is a pre-requisite for generating specific
emotional intuitions [9,21]. The fact that cultural shifts and
individual differences in moralization occur suggests that morality
is not always intrinsic to stimuli, but may be the result of
construing those actions as morally-relevant [22]. Moreover, there
is evidence that different people construe different issues in moral
(or non-moral) terms—termed moral mandates [23]. It is unclear,
however, whether individual differences in the moralization of
specific issues is based on intuitions built on biological and cultural
differences or construal processes. This raises a critical question:
can people quickly change between a moral versus non-moral
construal of the same action or issue?
A Dynamic Model of Evaluation
Although it may seem sensible that individuals can appraise or
construe the same action in different ways, there is a surprising
lack of empirical evidence on this issue in the domain of morality.
In a recent paper on the dynamic nature of evaluation, we
hypothesized that evaluation should indeed be sensitive to moral
versus non-moral construal processes [24]. For example, people
may be able to construe a situation or stimulus in moral or non-
moral terms depending on their goals and beliefs, which will direct
attention, modulate perception and guide consequent emotional
intuitions. For the purposes of the present research, we use the
terms moral and non-moral to describe different evaluative modes.
This over-simplified distinction reflects the fact that participants
are explicitly told to make moral evaluations (how right or wrong is
an action) in each study. To provide a contrast with moral
evaluations, participants also make pragmatic (how personally
good or bad is an action) or hedonic (how personally pleasant or
unpleasant is an action) evaluations. These latter conditions are
termed ‘‘non-moral’’ simply because participants are not explicitly
asked to make moral evaluations. We are aware that certain
participants may consider hedonic maximization or self-interest
moral imperatives [25,26]. Indeed, Kohlberg [27] considered self-
interest the second stage of moral reasoning.
To test our hypothesis, in the current research we directly
manipulated the way people evaluated a wide variety of actions to
determine whether construal has an influence on evaluations of the
exact same actions.
Our predictions are grounded in a dynamical model of
evaluation—termed the Iterative Reprocessing (IR) Model
[24,28,29]. Whereas many dual-process models characterize
human evaluation as a function of automatically activated
associations and subsequent, corrective control processes [30],
the IR Model highlights the dynamic interactions between
multiple component processes in the evaluative system. A key
assumption underlying our model is that brain systems are
organized hierarchically, such that lower–order automatic pro-
cesses influence and are influenced by higher–order processes [31].
As such, reflective processes do not merely override or control
automatic ones—these processes work in a dynamic, interactive
fashion to construct evaluations. In this way, object construal plays
an important role in determining evaluations, including shaping
the initial response to a stimulus.
The IR Model makes a distinction between the contents (e.g.,
attitudes and representations), processes (e.g., mental operations and
computations) and outcomes of evaluation [28]. Thus, while people
may develop relatively stable moral content (e.g., standards and
values), whether these contents influence an evaluation at any given
moment likely depends on whether an action or issue is processed
in moral or non-moral terms (in this paper, we use the term
‘‘processed’’ in the broad sense to include stimulus construal).
Although it is likely the case that highly moralized actions (like
murder) are chronically and reflexively processed as moral (i.e., the
representations rapidly stabilize in a way that reflects the moral
construal) and are therefore commonly evaluated in moral terms,
we propose that many actions can be evaluated according to moral
considerations [28]. A helpful analogy is available in the social
psychology literature. When perceivers categorize targets as in-
group members it has important implications for their perceptions,
evaluations and behavior [32,33], and can even override ostensibly
automatic biases to visually salient categories like race [32,34,35].
Thus, construal or categorization can even shape automatic
evaluations of stimuli with strong affective associations [36].
In the current research, we test the prediction that a wide
variety of actions can be evaluated using both moral and non-
moral considerations, and that this construal process can lead to
different evaluative outcomes for the same actions. In three
experiments, we instructed people to evaluate the same stimuli in
moral versus non-moral (i.e., pragmatic or hedonic) terms. By
holding the influence of the stimuli constant while varying the
construal, we were able to investigate the influence of moral versus
non-moral construal. This ensures that differences observed in the
nature of evaluative outcomes are due to differences in the
construal (or an interaction between construal and stimuli) rather
than the mere influence of the stimuli. If our assumptions are
accurate, evaluating actions on the basis of moral versus non-
moral considerations should lead to different evaluative outcomes.
As long as there is some moral content that participants can bring to
bear on their evaluation, moral construal may alter the evaluation
of actions that have not been typically seen as moral. For example,
one can bring to mind the moral aspects of recycling (e.g., saving
the environment) even if more pragmatic aspects normally
predominate (e.g., the time and effort involved). Of course, there
may be some actions that have virtually no moral content to draw
upon when generating an evaluation. For those stimuli, moral and
non-moral evaluative outcomes may be similar.
The Flexibility of Moral Construal
We are not the first to suggest that people can flexibly construe
and evaluate the same actions as moral or not [37]. For instance,
models of ethical decision-making distinguish between moral
awareness, in which a person recognizes that a situation may have
moral relevance, and moral judgment, in which the moral value of a
course of action is determined. These models predict that only if a
person is morally aware will they apply processes to render a moral
judgment [38,39,40]. The division between these stages is
important because it can account for particular types of moral
failure in which people make immoral decisions not because they
intended to do so or because they mistakenly evaluate an immoral
act as moral, but rather because they fail to consider the action on
the basis of moral considerations in the first place. Although moral
awareness and moral judgment are conceptually distinct, the
majority of psychological research on morality has focused on the
latter, investigating how characteristics of the perceiver, the
stimulus and/or the social context affect judgments of right or
The Importance of Moral Construal
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wrong regarding issues that are ostensibly morally-relevant
[18,19,41,42]. However, before making a moral judgment, the
evaluative system must be ready to evaluate the action in moral
terms—people have to construe the stimulus as potentially morally
relevant.
In related work, Tetlock and colleagues [43] have proposed that
people are multifunctional entities who shift between different
decision-making frameworks depending on the context and their
current goals. Thus, the same person may alternate between acting
as an ‘‘intuitive economist’’ animated by utilitarian goals, and a
‘‘principled theologian’’ animated by the need to protect sacred
values from secular encroachments. To investigate the tension
between these forms of evaluation, they forced participants to
consider tradeoffs between moral and pragmatic values—termed a
taboo trade-off. As it turns out, people often react with moral
outrage when a material valuation is placed on sacred items or
events [44]. This research highlights that sometimes an opposition
exists between moral and pragmatic evaluative processes, and that
when pitted against one another, moral considerations typically
dominate judgments. Again, however, this opposition may be
unique to specific types of highly moralized stimuli; further, these
studies require participants to engage in pragmatic and moral
forms of evaluation simultaneously. To better understand the
differences between moral and non-moral evaluation, the current
research separates and compares moral and non-moral construals
of the same actions.
Some recent research suggests that moral judgments are not
intrinsic to issues, but are the result of construing actions as
morally-relevant (i.e., moral awareness). In one paper, directing
participants’ attention to an action that violates moral rules elicited
deontological preferences, whereas directing their attention to the
outcomes that favored the violation of a moral rule elicited
utilitarian preferences [21]. In a different paper, participants were
randomly assigned to rate 70 stimuli—including a subset of 20
mundane objects (e.g., refrigerator, desk)—on how morally good or
bad they thought the stimuli were or how much they liked or disliked
the stimuli [45]. Although the mean ratings were not directly
compared across these two conditions, the mundane objects were
judged positively (relative to the mid-point of the scale) in the
moral condition. These studies not only suggest that people can
view relatively mundane stimuli as having moral value, but that
construal can change the evaluation [46].
The Current Research
We present three experiments in which participants were
instructed to evaluate the same stimuli—a wide range of positive
and negative actions—in moral and/or non-moral terms. In each
of the experiments, we asked participants to make moral and non-
moral evaluations of the same actions to determine whether moral
(rating whether actions were morally good or bad) relative to non-moral
(rating whether actions were pragmatically or hedonically good or bad)
construal would lead to different evaluative outcomes. We
assumed that potential courses of action could be construed in
multiple ways, and that how they were construed would influence
the nature of the evaluations. By holding stimuli constant, we
could examine whether moral versus non-moral construal can
influence evaluations. If we observe differences in the nature of
resulting evaluations and associated judgments it would provide
evidence that the distinction between moral construal (which is
triggered by a situational cue in this case) and evaluation stages is
an important one, and that moral and non-moral modes of
evaluation can be flexibly applied to the same stimuli.
To examine the influence of moral construal, we employed a
task facilitation paradigm [47]. This paradigm allowed us to
determine whether making a moral versus non-moral evaluation
about one’s actions was associated with universality judgments
about the behavior of others. The paradigm was based on the
following logic: if the process of performing the first task (i.e.,
generating an evaluation) or the information activated during the
first task was relevant to the second task (i.e., making a universality
judgment), then the time needed to perform the second task should
be reduced [48]. Therefore, to assess the extent to which two or
more tasks rely on similar processes/information, one can analyze
the degree to which performing the first task diminishes the time
needed to complete the second task. The task facilitation effect will
be greatest when the processes or information are highly similar in
both tasks. Similarly, any differences in task facilitation between
conditions will reflect the differential relevance of processes or
activated information rather than differences in stimuli (which
were held constant). It is also possible that differences between
conditions might reflect aspects of task interference rather than
facilitation.
In the current research, the first task involved a moral,
pragmatic or hedonic evaluation and the second task was a
universality judgment. We compared the average reaction time for
universality judgments between conditions to determine whether
these judgments were more strongly associated with moral,
pragmatic or hedonic evaluative modes. We chose to examine
universality judgments because universality is widely considered to
be a hallmark of moral cognition. Moral philosophers and
psychologists have long posited that moral evaluations are (or
should be) associated with universal prescriptions—the belief that
absolutely everybody should act in the same way [49,50,51,52,53].
Other psychologists have argued that moral attitudes are
experienced as matters of fact that others could or should be
persuaded to share, rather than as matters of preference, taste or
convention [16,23,54]. Further, compared to conventional trans-
gressions, for example, moral transgressions are consistently rated
as more wrong, punishable, independent of authority, and
universally applicable. These differences emerge early in life and
appear to hold across societies [55,56,57]. We predicted that if
moral evaluation is more strongly linked to universality than other
forms of evaluation, the time required to make a universality
judgment should be shorter following a moral evaluation than a
non-moral evaluation. We also assessed whether moral evaluations
were more highly correlated with the subsequent universality
judgments, and predicted that this correlation should be stronger
than the correlation between pragmatic evaluations and the
subsequent universality judgments.
In addition, we hypothesized that construing actions in different
ways would give rise to observable differences in evaluation,
despite holding the stimuli constant. Empirical work suggests that
moral evaluation entails black-and-white thinking and moral
absolutes. For example, moral attitudes are more durable and
resistant to temptation [13], and are associated with stronger
reactions to dissimilar others [23], both of which are indicators of
attitude strength [58]. As noted, other research suggests that moral
judgments are often based on moral intuitions or heuristics [1],
leading to quick and simple judgments. We therefore predicted
that moral evaluations would be more extreme and rendered faster
than non-moral evaluations of the same actions. However,
research on moral reasoning raised the alternative prediction that
moral evaluations might be more deliberate and, therefore, take
longer than non-moral evaluations [59]. Our paradigm allowed us
to directly test these competing hypotheses by comparing
participants’ reaction times to moral and non-moral evaluations
of the same stimuli.
The Importance of Moral Construal
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We also sought to examine whether people could shift back-
and-forth between moral and non-moral evaluations of the same
objects. Although studies have recently suggested that moral
awareness may be relatively flexible [45], none have directly
examined whether or not people are able to shift back-and-forth
between moral and non-moral construals of the same stimuli
within the same session. Our multi-level model of the human
evaluative system assumes that top-down influences on evaluation
are highly flexible and update rapidly [24,28,29]. We therefore
anticipated that people could evaluate actions in moral or non-
moral terms in a flexible fashion. To examine this possibility, we
had participants switch back-and-forth between moral and non-
moral evaluation. As elaborated above, we predicted that
evaluations would be faster, more extreme, and more strongly
associated with universally prescriptive judgments following moral
as compared with pragmatic or hedonic evaluations—and that
these effects would shift to reflect the current moral versus non-
moral evaluative mode, even if these shifts were separated by mere
seconds.
Experiment 1
Overview and Predictions
In the first experiment, participants made moral and pragmatic
evaluations of a wide variety of actions—including actions
typically construed in moral terms (e.g., murder, honesty), and
actions that are not (e.g., riding a bike, eating). In order to test
whether moral evaluations were more universally prescriptive than
pragmatic evaluations, after rating each action in moral or
pragmatic terms, participants then rated how many other people
should/should not engage in the action (universality judgment).
Each trial consisted of an evaluation (moral or pragmatic) followed
by a universality judgment of the same action. We measured the
ratings and reaction time for the evaluation and the universality
judgment. In addition to exploring the relationship between
different evaluations and universality, we used this information to
test whether moral (relative to pragmatic) evaluations were
associated with faster and more extreme evaluations.
We predicted that if moral evaluations are more strongly linked
to universality than pragmatic evaluations, two things should
occur. First, the time required to make a universality judgment
should be shorter following a moral evaluation than a pragmatic
evaluation. Second, moral evaluations should be highly correlated
with the subsequent universality judgments, and this correlation
should be stronger than the correlation between pragmatic
evaluations and the subsequent universality judgments.
Material and Methods
Participants. Forty-five undergraduate students (26 females;
mean age= 20 years) participated for partial course credit for an
Introduction to Psychology course. One participant was removed
from analysis for failing to follow instructions.
Procedure. Participants arrived at the lab in small groups
and completed all tasks on individual computers. Participants read
that they would be presented with a number of different behaviors
(e.g., getting a flu shot) and would be asked to evaluate them. They
were also told that there were at least two ways of evaluating an
action: ‘‘One way of evaluating an action is by thinking about
whether it would be good or bad for you personally. These
pragmatic judgments focus on pros and cons, and take into
account the benefit or the harm you may experience if you do
something. A second way of evaluating an action is by thinking
about how moral or ethical it is. Rather than thinking about what
would benefit you personally, these moral judgments focus on
whether or not you ought to do something because it is the right or
the wrong thing to do.’’ Participants were also told that after
evaluating each action, they would be asked to rate how many
other people should engage in that behavior.
Participants were presented with 104 actions (e.g., recycle, shop-
lift, study; see Appendix S1A for complete list of stimuli) one at a
time on a desktop computer using E-Prime (see Figure 1).
Participants made moral evaluations for 52 actions using the
keyboard, rating ‘‘how morally wrong/right it would be for you
to [action]’’ (1 = very wrong to 7 = very right), and pragmatic evaluations
for the other 52 actions, rating ‘‘how personally bad/good you
think it would be for you to [action]’’ (1 = very bad to 7= very good).
Actions remained on screen until participants made a response
(M=3,683 ms). Following each moral and pragmatic judgment,
participants made universality judgments for the same action, rating
‘‘how many other people should [action]’’ (1 = nobody to 7 = every-
body).
The actions were presented in four blocks. In each block,
participants made moral and universality evaluations for 13
actions before switching to pragmatic and universality evaluations
for 13 different actions. The order of moral and pragmatic
judgments was counterbalanced such that half of the participants
made moral judgments first within each block, and half made
pragmatic judgments first. Actions were randomly assigned within
participants to be evaluated morally versus pragmatically.
Participants never made a moral and pragmatic evaluation of
the same action; however, across participants, each action was
equally likely to be evaluated according to moral or pragmatic
standards. This ensured that any differences between moral and
pragmatic evaluations were not due to the specific actions but to
differences in moral versus pragmatic evaluation.
Analyses. To assess differences between moral versus prag-
matic evaluation, we conducted 2 (evaluation type: moral,
pragmatic)64 (block: 1, 2, 3, 4) analyses of variance (evaluation
type and block were repeated measure factors) on the speed with
which participants made evaluations, the overall valence and
extremity of their evaluations, and their reaction times to
subsequent universality ratings. To analyze reaction times, we
removed trials with extremely slow (.10,000 ms) reaction times
and log-transformed all remaining reaction times to minimize the
influence of outliers and skewness [60]. To ease interpretation, all
reported means are based on raw reaction times. Analyses with
raw and log-transformed reaction times were nearly identical.
Traditional analyses of repeated measures have tended to focus
on mean-level differences in reaction time or accuracy. However,
this approach has the consequence of reducing hundred of trials to
a single score for each participant diminishing power and
meaningful variance. To more accurately measure moral and
pragmatic judgments we used multi-level modeling [61]. Multi-
level modeling allows for the direct analysis of accuracy on
individual trials and helps overcome violations of independence
that occur as a result of correlated trials within participants. When
an assumption of independence is not satisfied, ignoring depen-
dency among trials can lead to invalid statistical conclusions;
namely the underestimation of standard errors and the overesti-
mation of the significance of predictors [62]. We therefore created
multi-level models with trials nested within participants to provide
more appropriate estimates of regression parameters. Multi-level
models were implemented in the SAS PROC MIXED procedure
[63].
Results
Moral evaluations are associated with universality. Our
primary prediction was that moral evaluations would be more
The Importance of Moral Construal
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strongly associated with universality judgments than pragmatic
evaluations. To test this hypothesis, we compared the reaction
times of universality judgments following moral versus pragmatic
evaluations. As predicted, participants were faster to make
universality judgments following moral (M=1,254 ms) compared
to pragmatic (M=1,443 ms) evaluations, F(1, 43) = 9.17, p,.01.
As shown in Table 1, participants were also faster to make
universality judgments during later blocks (a practice effect), F(3,
129) = 72.46, p,.01; however, the effect of condition was not
moderated by block (p= .94). Moreover, an item-by-item analysis
indicated that evaluating an action in moral terms facilitated
subsequent universality judgments regardless of the moral rating it
received—even actions that were rated as morally neutral led to
faster universality judgments. These results demonstrate that
moral evaluations facilitated universality judgments more than
pragmatic evaluations throughout the study, suggesting that
participants were able to switch between moral and pragmatic
evaluative modes.
To examine whether this facilitation effect held across the full
range of actions or was specific to actions with certain moral
ratings we conducted an item-level analysis. We calculated means
across participants for each action: its mean moral rating, and
separate mean reaction times for universality judgments following
moral and pragmatic evaluations. Using a hierarchical regression
analysis, we then regressed mean reaction times for universality
judgments on preceding evaluation type (moral vs. pragmatic), the
mean moral rating of each action and their interaction term.
Consistent with the primary analysis, there was a significant main
effect of preceding evaluation type, such that participants were
faster to make universality judgments following a moral than a
pragmatic evaluation (p,.01). There were also linear and
curvilinear effects of moral rating: actions with higher mean
moral ratings (i.e., actions rated as more moral) were associated
with slower universality judgments (p= .05) and actions with
extreme moral ratings (i.e., highly immoral and moral actions)
were associated with faster universality judgments (p,.01).
Critically, the main effect of preceding evaluation type was not
moderated by the linear (p..60) or curvilinear (p..90) moral
rating terms.
We also examined whether universality judgments were more
highly correlated with preceding moral than pragmatic evalua-
tions. As predicted, a two-way interaction between evaluation type
and the preceding moral/pragmatic rating, F(1, 43) = 11.18,
p,.01, indicated that participants’ universality ratings were more
strongly associated with preceding moral (ß = .93) than pragmatic
(ß = .83) ratings. As such, participants were more likely to indicate
that nobody should engage in actions evaluated as immoral
relative to actions evaluated as personally negative; conversely,
participants were more likely to indicate that everybody should
engage in actions evaluated as moral relative to actions evaluated
as personally positive. Once again, this interaction was not
moderated by block (p= .58). These results demonstrate that
Figure 1. A visual representation of the moral and pragmatic evaluation trials presented in Experiment 1. On each trial, a fixation cross
appeared for 1,000 ms before participants made a moral or pragmatic evaluation followed by a universality judgment. We recorded reaction times on
the moral/pragmatic evaluation and university judgment. The trials were presented in four blocks. In each block, participants made moral and
universality evaluations for 13 actions before switching to pragmatic and universality evaluations for 13 different actions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048693.g001
Table 1. Mean responses following moral versus pragmatic
evaluations in Experiment 1.
DV Task Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Average
Evaluation
RT
Moral 4,448 3,618 3,283 3,031 3,595 (148)
Pragmatic 4,748 3,866 3,566 3,326 3,877 (148)
Extremity Moral 5.82 5.81 5.80 5.96 5.85 (.19)
Pragmatic 5.59 5.75 5.61 5.40 5.59 (.19)
Universality
RT
Moral 1,806 1,247 1,071 893 1,254 (100)
Pragmatic 2,116 1,384 1,255 1,016 1,443 (100)
Means are provided for raw reaction times (RT; in milliseconds) and extremity of
responses for each block. Excludes all trials with reaction times .10,000 ms.
Overall scores may not reflect mean Block scores due to rounding errors and
missing trials. Pooled standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048693.t001
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universality judgments (nobody/everybody) were more highly
correlated with moral (wrong/right) than pragmatic (bad/good)
ratings. In sum, these results are consistent with the general
hypothesis that moral evaluations are associated with universality
judgments to a greater degree than pragmatic evaluations.
Moral evaluations are extreme. We predicted that moral
evaluations would be more positive and/or more extreme than
pragmatic evaluations. Whereas previous research has suggested
that people who rate objects on whether they are morally good or bad
may come to rate them more positively [45], we found no
difference on the overall ratings of actions when participants made
moral (M=4.07) or pragmatic (M=4.04), F(1, 43) = .22, p= .64,
and there was no interaction with block (p= .22).
We predicted that moral evaluations would be more extreme
than pragmatic evaluations of the same actions. To test this
hypothesis, we computed and compared the extremity of moral
versus pragmatic ratings. Since all moral/pragmatic ratings
ranged in valence from one to seven, we created curvilinear
extremity scores by mean centering and squaring each rating. For
example, a rating of 5 (out of 7) would be computed by subtracting
the overall mean (4.05) and squaring the difference (.95)*(.95) to
provide an extremity score (.90). As shown in Table 1, participants
made marginally more extreme moral (M=5.85) than pragmatic
(M=5.59) ratings of the same actions, F(1, 43) = 3.54, p= .067.
Consistent with the prediction that participants would be able to
switch between moral and pragmatic evaluative modes, the effect
of evaluation type was not moderated by block (p= .39). These
results indicate that moral evaluations were more extreme than
pragmatic evaluations of the same actions (see Figure 2).
Moral evaluations are fast. We predicted that moral
judgments would be faster than pragmatic evaluations of the
same actions. To test this hypothesis, we compared the reaction
times of moral versus pragmatic evaluations. As predicted,
participants were faster to provide moral (M=3,595 ms) than
pragmatic (M=3,877 ms) evaluations of the same actions, F(1,
43) = 11.29, p,.01. As shown in Table 1, participants were faster
to respond in later blocks, F(3, 129) = 99.86, p,.01, indicating a
task-learning effect; however, the effect of condition was not
moderated by block (p= .97). These results demonstrate that moral
evaluations were faster than pragmatic evaluations throughout the
study, suggesting that these were distinct modes of evaluation and
participants were able to switch back and forth between moral and
pragmatic evaluative modes.
Discussion
Consistent with our predictions, moral and pragmatic construals
of the same actions were associated with distinct evaluative
outcomes. Moral evaluations made on the same set of actions were
faster, more extreme and more universally prescriptive than
pragmatic evaluations. Further, these distinct consequences were
maintained as participants switched back-and-forth between moral
and pragmatic evaluations, indicating that these evaluations are
not only distinct, but are also highly sensitive to current top-down
construal.
These findings are consistent with what is known about the
flexibility of the human evaluative system [24,28] and suggest that
many issues may not necessitate automatic and inflexible
construals. Although many issues, such as incest or pushing
someone off of a footbridge, may evoke moral considerations,
Experiment 1 suggests that people can deliberately construe and
evaluate a host of issues in reference to moral considerations.
Thus, while chronic moralization about many issues may elicit
strong attitudes [1,12,23], construal can shape the evaluation of
many of these same issues and lead to several different evaluative
outcomes.
The results from Experiment 1 provide evidence that thinking
morally is associated with universality. Specifically, participants
were not only faster to make a universality judgment following a
moral than a pragmatic evaluation, but mean moral judgments
were more highly correlated with mean universality judgments
than pragmatic judgments. However, the wording of the
universality item was general enough that it could imply
normativity or desirability. Classic research on morality has shown
that it is important to distinguish moral norms from mere social
conventions or personal preferences. Further, by asking where
‘‘how many other people should’’ engage in a given action we may
have left open the definition of ‘‘other people’’. Participants may
interpret ‘‘other people’’ to mean group members at almost any
level of social categorization (e.g., university students, Americans,
humans). Consequently, narrow interpretations of ‘‘other people’’
allows for relativism, as any moral norm may only be applied to a
narrow subset of humanity.
We were, however, interested in assessing the relationship
between moral evaluation and universal moral duty—what Kant
termed the ‘‘categorical imperative’’ [50]. Categorical imperatives
are moral principles that are intrinsically valid and must be obeyed
by all people in all situations and circumstances. According to
Kant, people should ‘‘Act only according to that maxim whereby
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law’’ [50]. To better approximate this construct, participants in
Experiment 2 were asked ‘‘whether each action should be
universally prohibited or required, where universal means that
something applies to all people, without limit or exception’’.
The results from Experiment 1 indicated that moral evaluations
were faster and more extreme than pragmatic evaluations. These
results are consistent with scientific and lay understandings of
morality. However, they may also be due to the difference in the
scales used for moral versus pragmatic evaluations: pragmatic
evaluations were made on a scale from very bad to very good whereas
moral evaluations were made on a scale from very wrong to very right.
Although both evaluations were made on 7-point scales, the
different labels that anchored each scale may have led to different
interpretations. One possibility is that the right/wrong anchors
may have implied more extreme judgments during moral
evaluation [64]. Further, the more extreme labels could have
primed a specific mindset that facilitated subsequent universality
judgments. Alternatively, the right/wrong anchors may have been
interpreted to mean the normativity or correctness of an action
(regardless of moral content). For example, participants may have
made extreme judgments because some actions are simply correct
(e.g., using keys to start a car) and others are incorrect (e.g., using
keys to start a refrigerator). We addressed these concerns in the
following experiments by holding the scales for moral and
pragmatic types of evaluation constant—participants evaluated
every action on a scale from very bad to very good.
Experiment 2
Overview and Predictions
In the second experiment, participants made moral and
pragmatic evaluations of a wide variety of actions to determine
whether moral evaluations were more strongly associated with
universal prescriptions than pragmatic evaluations. In order to test
this hypothesis, participants rated each action as moral or
pragmatic and then rated whether the action should be universally
prohibited/required. We also attempted to replicate the results
from Experiment 1 showing that moral evaluations are associated
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with faster and more extreme evaluative outcomes than pragmatic
evaluations while holding the scale labels constant for both types of
evaluation.
Material and Methods
Participants. Seventy undergraduate psychology students
(50 females; mean age = 19) participated for partial course credit.
Four participants were removed from analysis for failing to follow
instructions.
Figure 2. The mean pragmatic and moral ratings (with standard errors) for each action in Experiment 1. The actions have been rank
ordered on the Y-axis from the highest (left) to lowest (right) mean rating. The X-axis reflects the rating scale (range 1–7). Pragmatic ratings are
relatively linear whereas moral ratings are curvilinear, reflecting differences in extremity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048693.g002
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Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, with
three important differences. The first difference was the inclusion
of a different universality question. After evaluating each action,
participants were asked whether the action should be universally
prohibited or required, where universal means that something
applies to all people, without limit or exception. Participants were
told ‘‘For something to be universally prohibited it means that
nobody should be permitted to do this action, without exception.
For something to be universally required it means that everybody
should be required to do this action, without exception.’’
Participants made these ratings on a 7-point scale (1 = universally
prohibited to 7= universally required). The second difference was
holding the scale labels constant for moral and pragmatic
evaluations. Specifically, participants made moral evaluations for 60
actions, rating ‘‘how morally bad/good it would be for you to
[action]’’ (1 = very bad to 7 = very good), and pragmatic evaluations for
the other 60 actions, rating ‘‘how personally bad/good you think it
would be for you to [action]’’ (1 = very bad to 7= very good).
Following each moral and pragmatic evaluation, participants
made universality judgments for the same action. The third difference
was the inclusion of 16 additional actions during evaluation (see
Appendix S1B; for a total of 120 actions).
Actions were presented in four blocks. In each block,
participants made moral and universality evaluations for 13
actions before switching to pragmatic and universality evaluations
for 13 different actions. The order of moral and pragmatic
judgments was counterbalanced such that half of the participants
made moral judgments first within each block, and half made
pragmatic judgments first. Actions were randomly assigned within
participants to be evaluated morally versus pragmatically.
Participants never made a moral and pragmatic evaluation of
the same action; however, across participants, each action was
equally likely to be evaluated according to moral or pragmatic
standards. This ensured that any differences between moral and
pragmatic evaluations were not due to the specific actions.
Results
To assess differences between moral versus pragmatic evalua-
tion, we conducted 2 (evaluation type: moral, pragmatic)64 (block:
1, 2, 3, 4) analyses of variance (where evaluation type and block
were repeated measure factors) on the speed with which
participants made evaluations, the overall valence and extremity
of their evaluations, and their reaction times to subsequent
universality ratings. To analyze reaction times, we removed trials
with extremely long (.10,000 ms) reaction times and log-
transformed all remaining reaction times. To ease interpretation,
all reported means are based on raw reaction times.
Moral evaluations are associated with universality. Our
primary prediction in Experiment 2 was that moral evaluations
would be more strongly associated with universality judgments
than pragmatic evaluations. To test this hypothesis, we compared
the reaction times of universality judgments following moral versus
pragmatic evaluations. As predicted, participants were faster to
make universality judgments following moral (M=1,438 ms)
compared to pragmatic (M=1,542 ms) ratings, F(1, 65) = 8.66,
p,.01. A main effect of block indicated that participants were
faster to make universality judgments during later blocks, F(3,
195) = 172.29, p,.01; however, the effect of evaluation type on the
speed of universality judgments was not moderated by block
(p= .50). Moreover, an item-by-item analysis indicated that
evaluating an action in moral terms facilitated subsequent
universality judgments regardless of the moral rating it re-
ceived—even actions that were rated as morally neutral.
Replicating the results from Experiment 1, moral evaluations
facilitated universality judgments more than pragmatic evaluations
throughout the study, suggesting that participants were able to
switch between moral and pragmatic evaluative modes.
As in Experiment 1, we conducted an item-level analysis to
examine whether this facilitation effect held across the full range of
actions or was specific to actions with certain moral ratings.
Consistent with the primary analysis, there was a significant main
effect of preceding evaluation type, such that participants were
faster to make universality judgments following a moral than a
pragmatic evaluation (p,.03). There were also linear and
curvilinear effects of moral rating: actions with higher mean
moral ratings (i.e., actions rated as more moral) were associated
with slower universality judgments (p,.02) and actions with
extreme moral ratings (i.e., highly immoral and moral actions)
were associated with faster universality judgments (p,.01).
Critically, the main effect of preceding evaluation type was not
moderated by the linear (p..15) or curvilinear (p..30) moral
rating terms.
Following the results of Experiment 1, we predicted that
universality judgments would be more highly correlated with
preceding moral than pragmatic evaluations. As predicted, a two-
way interaction between evaluation type and the preceding moral/
pragmatic rating, F(1, 65) = 20.83, p,.01, indicated that partici-
pants’ universality ratings were more strongly associated with
preceding moral (ß = .75) than pragmatic (ß = .70) ratings. As such,
participants were more likely to indicate that nobody should
engage in actions evaluated as immoral relative to actions
evaluated as personally negative; conversely, participants were
more likely to indicate that everybody should engage in actions
evaluated as moral relative to actions evaluated as personally
positive. We also found an unexpected three-way interaction with
block, F(3, 195) = 2.66, p= .05, indicating that this interaction was
strongest during the first two blocks. However, this effect was not
replicated in the other experiments. In sum, these results are
consistent with the general hypothesis that moral evaluations are
associated with universality judgments to a greater degree than
pragmatic evaluations.
Moral evaluations are extreme. Following the results of
Experiment 1, we predicted that moral evaluations would be more
extreme than pragmatic evaluations of the same actions, but not
more positive or negative. Consistent with Experiment 1, we found
no difference on the overall rated valence of actions when
participants made moral (M=4.21) or pragmatic (M=4.27)
evaluations (p= .64). As predicted, participants made more
extreme moral (M=5.53) than pragmatic (M=5.32) ratings of
the same actions, F(1, 65) = 3.93, p= .05 (see Table 2). Consistent
with the prediction that participants would be able to switch
between moral and pragmatic evaluative modes, the effect of
evaluation type was not moderated by block (p= .35). These results
indicate that moral evaluations were more extreme than pragmatic
evaluations of the same actions.
Moral evaluations are fast. Following the results of
Experiment 1, we predicted that moral judgments would be faster
than pragmatic evaluations of the same actions. To test this
hypothesis, we compared the reaction times of moral versus
pragmatic evaluations. As predicted, participants were faster to
provide moral (M=3,188 ms) than pragmatic (M=3,386 ms)
evaluations of the same actions, F(1, 65) = 14.18, p,.01. Partic-
ipants were also faster to respond in later blocks, F(3, 195) = 85.85,
p,.01, indicating a task-learning effect; however, the effect of
condition was not moderated by block (p= .94). Replicating the
results from Experiment 1, moral evaluations were faster than
pragmatic evaluations across the blocks, suggesting that partici-
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pants were able to switch back and forth between moral and
pragmatic evaluative modes.
Discussion
The results of the first two experiments provide convergent
evidence that thinking morally is associated with universality.
Specifically, participants were not only faster to make a
universality judgment following a moral than a pragmatic
evaluation, but mean moral judgments were more highly
correlated with mean universality judgments than were pragmatic
judgments. Comparing the effects of moral and pragmatic
evaluation is important because it illustrates how easily people
can depart from rational, pragmatic decision-making and shows
that this departure has important implications for evaluative
outcomes. However, since moral judgments were only compared
to pragmatic evaluations, any inferences about the nature of moral
evaluation from the first two experiments must rely on both the
nature of pragmatic judgment and the nature of the psychological
contrast between moral and pragmatic construal (e.g., moral
judgments may be less complex).
To address these concerns, we compared moral judgment to an
alternative type of judgment in experiment 3—a simple judgment
about whether each action is pleasant or unpleasant [65]. We also
reasoned that the hedonic evaluations were likely to be highly
subjective, which might lead to relatively weak associations with
universality, even relative to pragmatic evaluations. The outcomes
of moral evaluation were thus compared with the outcomes of a
simple hedonic evaluation. We also compared differences between
moral and hedonic evaluation with differences between moral and
pragmatic evaluation to see if the non-moral condition (pragmatic
versus hedonic) had any major implications for interpreting the
results from the first two experiments.
The results from the first two experiments indicated that
participants were able to shift back-and-forth between moral and
pragmatic evaluations with distinct consequences, indicating that
the evaluations are sensitive to construal. Participants were able to
evaluate a series of actions using moral considerations and then
quickly shift to evaluate a separate series of actions using
pragmatic considerations. Although this level of flexibility is
impressive, no single participant was forced to provide moral and
pragmatic evaluations of the same object(s). If moral evaluation is
truly flexible, participants may be able to evaluate the exact same
action in very different ways depending on their current evaluative
mode. Moreover, this flexibility should lead to different evaluative
outcomes for the same stimuli even when the different evaluations
take place only moments apart. For example, a person who is
considering the pragmatic costs of recycling but is suddenly
reminded to consider its moral implications may have a sudden
change of heart about discarding an empty bottle in the trash.
Although this example seems intuitively plausible, human
concerns about being and appearing consistent [66,67], along
with psychological anchoring processes [68] render this a
conservative test of the flexibility hypothesis. In Experiment 3,
each participant made both moral and non-moral evaluations of
the same set of actions during the same experimental session, and
type of evaluation switched semi-randomly on a trial-by-trial basis
(see below). We predicted that moral evaluations would be
associated with different evaluative outcomes (e.g., universality)
relative to non-moral evaluations, even when participants made
both forms of evaluation toward the same objects during the same
session.
Experiment 3
Overview and Predictions
We have presented evidence that participants were able to shift
back-and-forth between moral and non-moral evaluative modes in
a relatively flexible fashion. The results from the first two
experiments suggest that people can shift between moral and
non-moral evaluative modes in a tonic fashion—shifting modes for
a series of trials (blocks) at a time. A stronger form of our
dynamical systems approach would predict that people can shift
between moral and non-moral evaluative modes in a phasic
fashion. If so, it would suggest that the construal process can
influence on evaluation on a moment to moment basis. In
Experiment 3, participants switched semi-randomly between
moral and non-moral (pragmatic or pleasantness) evaluations on
a trial-by-trial basis.
As in the first two experiments, participants rated whether each
action was moral or non-moral (pragmatic or pleasant) and then
rated whether the action should be universally prohibited/
required. However, in this experiment we compared differences
between moral and pragmatic evaluations with differences
between moral and hedonic evaluations to see if the non-moral
condition (pragmatic versus hedonic) had any major implications
for interpreting the results from the first two experiments. This
allowed us to determine whether moral evaluations were more
strongly associated with universal prescriptions than two forms of
non-moral evaluation. We predicted that moral evaluations would
be associated with different evaluative outcomes (e.g., universality)
relative to non-moral evaluations, even when participants were
forced to shift back and forth between moral and non-moral
evaluations every few seconds.
Material and Methods
Participants. One hundred and forty-eight undergraduate
psychology students (84 females; mean age = 20) participated for
partial course credit. Three participants did not complete the
experiment and were not included in the analysis.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to the previous
experiment, with three important differences. First, participants
were randomly assigned to make non-moral evaluations on the
basis of pragmatic or hedonic concerns. Thus, half the participants
made moral and pragmatic evaluations (as in the previous two
experiments), and half the participants made moral and hedonic
evaluations. Second, participants shifted between moral and non-
moral evaluations on a trial-by-trial basis. However, the order of
Table 2. Mean responses following moral versus pragmatic
evaluations in Experiment 2.
DV Task Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Average
Evaluation
RT
Moral 3,961 3,232 2,945 2,614 3,188 (110)
Pragmatic 4,180 3,429 3,098 2,838 3,386 (110)
Extremity Moral 5.84 5.41 5.48 5.39 5.53 (.17)
Pragmatic 5.39 5.18 5.37 5.35 5.32 (.17)
Universality
RT
Moral 2,187 1,388 1,182 1,029 1,446 (87)
Pragmatic 2,282 1,540 1,304 1,094 1,555 (87)
Means are provided for raw reaction times (RT; in milliseconds) and extremity of
responses for each block. Excludes all trials with reaction times .10,000 ms.
Overall scores may not reflect mean Block scores due to rounding errors and
missing trials. Pooled standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048693.t002
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every pair of moral and non-moral trials was randomized to
ensure that participants could not anticipate that every even (or
odd) numbered trial was always moral (non-moral). For example,
if participants made a moral and then a non-moral evaluation on
the first two trials, the order of the moral and non-moral
evaluations in the subsequent two trials was randomly determined.
This design allowed us to test whether the previous effects of moral
versus non-moral evaluations were based on some kind of tonic
moral versus non-moral mindset, or whether participants were
capable of flexibly shifting from moral to non-moral evaluations in
a flexible and rapid (phasic) fashion. Third, each participant made
both moral and non-moral evaluations of the same set of actions
during the same experimental session (in the previous experiments,
participants never evaluated the same action twice).
Analyses. To assess differences between moral versus prag-
matic evaluation, we conducted 2 (evaluation type: moral, non-
moral)62 (non-moral: pragmatic, hedonic) repeated-measures
analyses on the speed with which participants made evaluations,
the overall valence and extremity of their evaluations, as well as
their reaction times to subsequent universality ratings. To analyze
reaction times, we removed trials with extremely long
(.10,000 ms) reaction times and log-transformed all remaining
reaction times. To ease interpretation, all reported means are
based on raw reaction times.
Results
Moral evaluations are associated with universality. Our
primary prediction in Experiment 3 was that moral evaluations
would be more strongly associated with universality judgments
than non-moral evaluations, regardless of whether moral evalu-
ations were contrasted with pragmatic or hedonic evaluations. To
test this hypothesis, we compared the reaction times of universality
judgments following moral versus non-moral (pragmatic and
hedonic) evaluations. As predicted, participants were faster to
make universality judgments following moral (M=1,651 ms)
compared to non-moral (M=1,701 ms) ratings, F(1,
143) = 10.81, p,.01. There was no main effect of the non-moral
control condition, F(1, 16848) = 1.47, p= .23, and the effect of
evaluation type did not differ when compared with pragmatic
versus hedonic evaluations (p= .91). Estimated G matrix was not
positive definite during the analysis of cross-level interactions when
the between-subjects variables were modeled as random effects.
Therefore, between-subjects main effects and interactions were
modeled as fixed effects. The degrees of freedom reflect the
difference between random and fixed effects parameters. Repli-
cating and extending the results from the first two experiments,
moral evaluations facilitated universality judgments more than
pragmatic or hedonic evaluations throughout the session, suggest-
ing that participants were able to switch between moral and non-
moral modes of evaluation. More importantly, Experiment 3
provided evidence that construal affected universality judgments
for the same actions within subjects, such that evaluating the same
people responded differently when evaluating the same action
morally versus non-morally.
Following the results from the first two experiments, we
predicted that universality judgments would be more highly
correlated with preceding moral than non-moral (pragmatic or
hedonic) evaluations. As predicted, a two-way interaction between
evaluation type and the preceding moral/non-moral rating, F(1,
143) = 202.39, p,.01, indicated that participants’ universality
ratings were more strongly associated with preceding moral
(ß = .72) than non-moral (ß = .58) ratings. As such, participants
were more likely to indicate that nobody should engage in actions
evaluated as immoral relative to actions evaluated as pragmatically
or hedonically negative; conversely, participants were more likely
to indicate that everybody should engage in actions evaluated as
moral relative to actions evaluated as pragmatically or hedonically
positive.
These effects were qualified by a three-way interaction between
evaluation type, and whether the non-moral condition was
pragmatic or hedonic, F(1, 16,844) = 19.15, p,.01. When the
control condition involved pragmatic evaluation, there was a two-
way interaction between evaluation type and the preceding moral/
pragmatic rating, F(1, 73) = 53.13, p,.01, indicating that partic-
ipants’ universality ratings were more strongly associated with
preceding moral (ß = .72) than non-moral (ß = .61) ratings.
However, when the control condition involved hedonic evaluation,
the two-way interaction between evaluation type and the
preceding moral/hedonic rating was stronger, F(1, 70) = 159.98,
p,.01, indicating that participants’ universality ratings were more
strongly associated with preceding moral (ß = .72) than non-moral
(ß = .56) ratings, and that this difference was greater than in the
moral/pragmatic condition. Although moral evaluations were
strongly linked to universality judgments of the same action in
both conditions, these results suggest that participants may have
been more willing to generalize their pragmatic evaluations to
others than their hedonic evaluations. However, the most robust
effect remains that universality judgments (universally prohibited/
required) were more highly correlated with moral than non-moral
ratings—whether they were pragmatic or hedonic in nature.
These results are consistent with the general hypothesis that moral
evaluations are associated with universality judgments to a greater
degree than other forms of evaluation.
Moral evaluations are extreme. Following the results of the
first two experiments, we predicted that moral evaluations would
be more extreme than non-moral evaluations of the same actions,
but not more positive or negative. Consistent with the previous
experiments, we found no difference on the overall valence ratings
of actions when participants made moral (M=4.19) or non-moral
(M=4.17) evaluations, F(1, 143) = .21, p= .65. As predicted,
participants made more extreme moral (M=5.10) than non-
moral (M=4.64) ratings of the same actions, F(1, 143) = 26.67,
p,.01 (see Table 3). There was no effect of non-moral (pragmatic
versus hedonic) evaluation (p= .60), and the effect of evaluation
type was not moderated by the non-moral evaluation (p= .66). In
other words, the nature of the non-moral condition did not make a
difference: people’s moral evaluations were more extreme than
their pragmatic or hedonic evaluations of the same actions.
Table 3. Mean responses following moral versus pragmatic
and moral versus hedonic evaluations in Experiment 3.
DV Task
Moral versus
Pragmatic
Moral versus
Hedonic
Evaluation RT Moral 3,656 (102) 3,667 (105)
Non-moral 3,857 (102) 3,787 (105)
Extremity Moral 5.07 (.17) 5.14 (.17)
Non-moral 4.56 (.17) 4.71 (.17)
Universality RT Moral 1,569 (76) 1,733 (78)
Non-moral 1,605 (76) 1,798 (78)
Means are provided for raw reaction times (RT; in milliseconds) and extremity of
responses for each block. Excludes all trials with reaction times .10,000 ms.
Overall scores may not reflect mean Block scores due to rounding errors and
missing trials. Pooled standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048693.t003
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Moral evaluations are fast. Following the results of the first
two experiments, we predicted that moral judgments would be
faster than non-moral evaluations of the same actions. To test this
hypothesis, we compared the reaction times of moral versus
pragmatic and hedonic evaluations. As predicted, participants
were faster to provide moral (M=3,661 ms) than non-moral
(M=3,822 ms) evaluations of the same actions, F(1, 143) = 28.86,
p,.01 (see Table 3). This increase in overall reaction time
relatively to the previous two experiments is likely due to the fact
that participants were forced to switch evaluations on a trial-by-
trial basis in Experiment 3, inducing a task-switching cost [69].
There was no effect of the non-moral (pragmatic versus hedonic)
evaluation (p= .72), and the effect of evaluation type was not
moderated by the non-moral evaluation (p= .15). In other words,
the nature of the non-moral condition did not make a difference:
people were faster to make moral evaluations than pragmatic or
hedonic evaluations. Replicating and extending the results from
the first two experiments, moral evaluations were faster than non-
moral evaluations throughout the study, suggesting that partici-
pants were able to switch back and forth between moral and non-
moral evaluative modes on a trial-by-trial basis.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 3 replicate and extend the results
from the first two experiments. The three experiments provide
convergent evidence that thinking morally is associated with
universality. Specifically, participants were not only faster to make
a universality judgment following a moral than a non-moral
evaluation, but mean moral judgments were more highly
correlated with mean universality judgments than non-moral
judgments. By replicating this pattern of effects when comparing
moral with both pragmatic and hedonic modes of evaluation, we
have increased confidence that the effects of moral evaluation are
not merely a consequence of the psychological contrast between
moral and pragmatic modes. However, the results of Experiment 3
indicated that different non-moral modes of evaluation are not
equivalent: people seemed more willing to universalize their
pragmatic than their hedonic evaluations.
Experiment 3 also provided the first evidence that people are
able to shift back-and-forth between moral and non-moral
evaluative modes in a highly flexible fashion—shifting construal
on a trial-by-trial basis. Whereas the results from the first two
experiments provided evidence that people could shift between
moral and non-moral evaluative modes in a tonic fashion—shifting
modes for a series or trials at a time—Experiment 3 indicated that
people can shift on-line between moral and non-moral evaluative
modes in a phasic fashion. This suggests that the effects of construal
are not limited to evaluative modes or mindsets. Further, showing
these differences within participants indicates that construal can
override consistency motives [66,67] and psychological anchoring
[68].
General Discussion
We present three experiments showing that moral evaluations
are susceptible to top-down influences. Specifically, we show that
people can deliberately construe a wide variety of actions through
either a moral or a non-moral lens with different consequences for
their evaluations. Thus, moral evaluation is not strictly a bottom-
up process. The current research provides evidence that moral and
non-moral construals of the same actions lead to distinct evaluative
outcomes. Specifically, the moral evaluative mode elicited faster,
more extreme and more universally prescriptive evaluations than
non-moral evaluative modes, consistent with longstanding as-
sumptions about morality. In short, evaluating an action in moral
terms increased people’s inclination to render judgments in
absolutes—more simple, extreme, black-and-white evaluations.
These differences in evaluative outcomes are consistent with the
contention that moral and non-moral construals triggered different
evaluations. In addition, our experiments suggest that people can
shift back-and-forth between moral and non-moral evaluations of
the same actions very quickly, consistent with dynamical models of
evaluation [24,28,29].
Much of the previous research on morality has made an implicit
assumption that moralization leads people to reflexively construe
certain actions or dilemmas as moral. Although this may certainly
be the case for many issues, such as murder and incest, the current
research suggests that people can construe and evaluate a host of
issues according to moral standards [45]. Thus, while moralization
involves the development of relatively stable moral contents (e.g.,
standards and values) and may instigate the construal of certain
acts in moral terms, whether these contents influence an
evaluation at any given moment likely depends on whether an
action or issue is construed in moral or non-moral terms. As such,
it seems likely that issues that have not necessarily been extensively
moralized (e.g., recycling) may allow for the most flexible
evaluations and lead to the largest differences between moral
and non-moral evaluative modes [70]. In contrast, actions that are
highly moralized (smothering a baby) or mundane (wearing a
sweater vest) may allow for less flexibility [23].
To investigate the influence of construal, we instructed
participants to evaluate the same stimuli in moral versus non-
moral (e.g., pragmatic) terms. Our experimental paradigm—
which holds stimuli constant while varying the mode of
evaluation—allowed us to investigate how flexibly moral versus
non-moral evaluative modes can be applied to judgment of the
same stimuli and ensured that differences observed in the nature of
evaluative outcomes were due to differences in the nature of
evaluative construal rather than the stimuli. As we predicted,
evaluating actions on the basis of moral versus non-moral
considerations lead to different evaluative outcomes. Specifically,
the present data suggests that moral evaluations are more likely to
be applied universally to others. In all three experiments, we found
that moral evaluations were more strongly associated with
universal prescriptions than non-moral evaluations. Future
research should explore the relationship between moral evaluation
and universality, including whether the effects of universality
extend across time as well as people and the implications of these
associations for human judgment and decision-making.
Building on our dynamical model of the evaluative system, we
distinguish between the contents (e.g., attitudes and standards) and
processes (e.g., mental operations and computations) of evaluation
[24,28,29]. Accordingly, as long as there are some moral contents
that participants can bring to bear on their evaluation, moral
evaluations may be applied to actions that have not been typically
seen as moral. For example, one can bring to mind the moral
aspects of recycling (e.g., saving the environment) even if more
pragmatic aspects normally predominate (e.g., the pain of driving
to the local recycling depot). Thus, the current work extends the
research by Skitka and colleagues [23] by showing that evaluating
an issue as moral (or not) varies not only across individuals, but
within individuals within seconds as a function of the construal the
person is applying. Indeed, Experiment 3 provided evidence that
construal influenced universality judgments for the same actions
within the same people.
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Moral Construal
The current research manipulates the construal people use to
evaluate different stimuli. Many others have proposed that moral
cognition can be understood by the processes involved in moral
reasoning rather than final judgments [14,15]. Kohlberg [27] had
participants respond to moral dilemmas and identified their stage
of moral development on the basis of their reasoning. Rationalist
approaches in moral psychology stress that moral judgments are
reached through a process of reasoning and reflection [15,16,71].
More recently, researchers have challenged the view that moral
reasoning is the sole or even primary means by which moral
judgments are made, arguing that certain situations automatically
elicit moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments [1].
According to the intuitionist model, moral reasoning frequently
follows an initial judgment, providing a post hoc justification but not
the causal impetus for a moral judgment. From the intuitionist
perspective, unconscious, affective responses guide reactions to
these morally charged scenarios and people often engage in
deliberate reasoning only after they have already made an initial
moral judgment.
The two stage models of ethical decision-making argue that the
‘‘eliciting situation’’ (e.g., a stimulus, situation or course of action)
is only likely to be judged as morally right or wrong when prior
processes first determine that the situation is to be evaluated in
moral terms. Given the variety of actions that elicited differences
between moral and non-moral evaluations in the current
experiments, we contend that moral evaluation can extend beyond
the actions and dilemmas that are typically examined in studies on
moral cognition. Thus, while certain eliciting situations, such as
smothering a baby [72], may serve to directly trigger moral
awareness in addition to providing a basis for the resultant moral
judgment, many situations are highly sensitive to framing and
construal [73]. For instance, research suggests that people can
make decisions using different perspectives, from the legal
viewpoint of a judge to the moral viewpoint of a citizen, and
these different perspectives can shape the processes underlying
legal and moral decisions [46].
Although the cognitive reasoning or intuitionist models of moral
evaluation are not necessarily inconsistent with a dissociation
between awareness and judgment stages in moral evaluation, by
using highly moralized stimuli and/or by asking people to form
moral judgments (cuing moral awareness), these research tradi-
tions may over-estimate the extent to which moral evaluation is
automatically triggered by stimulus features. Paradigms designed
to examine moral judgment in both the moral reasoning and
intuitionist traditions are predominantly stimulus-driven, confront-
ing participants with situations or dilemmas that are assumed a
priori to be morally relevant (or not). Many of these studies cannot
easily discriminate effects due to differences between moral and
non-moral forms of evaluation from effects due to stimulus
differences; even in studies that contrast judgments and decisions
made in response to ostensibly moral and non-moral situations,
these conditions differ both in type of evaluation and type of
stimuli. We therefore suggest that extant research on the
psychological underpinnings of moral evaluation does not provide
much direct evidence that moral awareness (choosing to evaluate
stimuli in moral terms) is independent of moral judgment.
Experimental approaches like the one employed here are
important for several reasons. First, they allow for a test of the
contention that many of the same actions can be evaluated in
moral and non-moral ways and that these different types of
evaluation have distinct evaluative outcomes. Second, this
approach helps disentangle the awareness and judgment stages
of moral evaluation. By having participants evaluate the same
actions in moral and/or non-moral terms we directly tested
whether evaluating stimuli in moral terms gave rise to distinct
outcomes. Research in the cognitive reasoning tradition that
explicitly directs participants to evaluate situations such as the
Heinz Dilemma in moral terms lacks the non-moral control
conditions necessary to dissociate these processes. In contrast,
research in the intuitionist tradition, in which participants evaluate
stimuli that are presumably moral (or not), cannot distinguish
effects due to moral evaluative processes from effects due to
stimulus characteristics. However, if different evaluative outcomes
are observed when participants evaluate the same actions in moral
versus non-moral terms, this supports the notion that moral
processes themselves have evaluative consequences beyond the
consequences associated with specific stimulus characteristics. By
directly comparing the evaluative outcomes of moral versus non-
moral modes of evaluation, we found that a moral evaluation
elicited faster, more extreme and more universally prescriptive
evaluations than non-moral evaluations.
We are not suggesting, however, that moral and non-moral (i.e.,
pragmatic or hedonic) modes of evaluation are completely
independent: differences observed between moral and non-moral
evaluation do not imply that the two forms of evaluation do not
share many of the same underlying processes. Many neural
component processes—especially those involved in representing
value—are likely common to both forms of evaluation [36].
Further, moral and pragmatic evaluations of the same action may
often lead to the same behavioral outcomes. Indeed, religious and
secular institutions impose punishments on many forms of self-
interested behavior to help ensure that pragmatic and moral
concerns are closely aligned to the benefit of the collective. For
example, the decision to commit a crime is not often only immoral,
but is likely to incur severe legal punishments. In this way, legal
and social sanctions act as deterrents for otherwise ‘‘immoral’’
behavior. Humans have spent centuries creating legal systems and
social institutions (including religions) that align pragmatic rewards
and punishments with moral concerns. This normally strong
relationship between moral and non-moral evaluations mitigates
potential differences, and makes our experimental tests of
differences between these evaluative modes conservative.
Lay Definitions of Morality
One of the major questions facing moral psychology is how one
knows whether something is in fact a moral issue [74,75,76]. For
the most part, researchers have used theoretical rationale or face
validity as the primary criterion for morality, assuming that acts
such as incest and murder are likely chronically construed as moral
and that attributions of blameworthiness reflect moral evaluations.
In the current research, we relied on participants’ lay understand-
ing of moral and non-moral evaluation. In some regards, this is a
strength of the current research as it bypasses assumptions on the
part of the researchers about the nature of moral versus non-moral
modes of evaluation. It does, however, raise the possibility that the
differences observed between moral and non-moral evaluation
may have stemmed, at least in part, from participants’ lay theories
about the difference between these two dimensions of evaluation
because our paradigm made participants aware that they were
providing both moral and non-moral evaluations. However, a
similar pattern of results holds for several non-moral evaluations
(pragmatic and hedonic), suggesting that our effects are not specific
to lay theories about the distinction between moral and pragmatic
evaluations. In any event, future research should examine whether
making this contrast salient enhances the reported differences.
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Future Research
In each of the experiments reported above, we instructed people
to evaluate the same stimuli in moral versus non-moral terms. This
experimental approach, which holds stimuli constant while
varying the mode of evaluation, is important because it allows us
to investigate how construal processes can be applied to judgment
of the same stimuli, and because it ensures that differences
observed in the nature of evaluative outcomes are due to
differences in the nature of evaluative processing rather than the
stimuli. As we noted above, we intentionally used the term
‘‘processed’’ in the broad sense to include stimulus construal.
Although our experimental design ensured that participants
evaluated the exact same stimuli in moral and non-moral
evaluative modes, this does not preclude the possibility that
different underlying representations (i.e., contents) were activated
and applied to the evaluations in both modes. We hold open the
possibility that any differences in evaluative outcomes may reflect
different underlying representations. For example, evaluating the
moral implications of recycling may activate a different set of
contents (e.g., representations based on beliefs and attitudes about
global warming, social responsibility, etc.) than evaluating the
pragmatic implications of recycling (e.g., the costs and benefits in
terms of the time and money involved in recycling). Future
research should use a combination of behavioral and physiological
measures to assess underlying differences in process versus content
[77].
Similarly, neuroimaging could be used to help understand the
hierarchical relationship between the brain systems implicated in
moral construal and evaluation, since these systems are frequently
confounded in extant research. We expect that the region of
ventral medial prefrontal cortex frequently implicated in moral
decision-making studies [78,79] may be sensitive to top-down
construals instigated by higher-order control processes implement-
ed by the fronto-parietal network [28,80,81]. This work may also
elucidate the mental computations that underlie moral and non-
moral evaluation.
Evidence that moral versus non-moral evaluations can be
moderated by construal, applied to wide range of actions, and are
associated with distinct evaluative outcomes, has a number of
important implications. First, the processes associated with
morality may be sensitive to motivation and social context. Moral
framing has been shown to increase generosity in economic games
[82]. Likewise, people primed with religious constructs may be
more likely to see the moral implications of their actions, leading to
more generous behavior [83]. Framing issues in terms of their
moral implications may also reduce selfish behavior in a variety of
contexts, such as cheating or paying taxes. Second, our data
suggest that morality is not always associated with specific issues,
but stems from the construal of those issues. Third, it raises the
possibility that moral construal may lead to systematic biases in
decision-making and behavior. For example, considering the
pragmatic versus moral implications of voting might have a
profound effect on voting behavior. If people focus on the time and
energy involved, they may be unlikely to vote; alternatively, if the
same people focus on their moral duty as voters for preserving a
healthy democracy, they may be willing to vote despite the
personal costs. As such, construing the same action in moral versus
pragmatic terms may ultimately lead to different evaluations and
behavior [84,85].
Conclusion
People engage in countless actions on a daily basis and these
actions can be based on a number of considerations, from gut
instinct to a rational cost-benefit analysis. The current research
suggests that people can also base their actions on their moral
standards, and using these standards alters the mental operations
used to evaluate those actions. As a consequence, ostensibly moral
acts may be construed and processed according to other standards,
and vice-versa. The effects of construal highlighted in the current
research suggest that generating an appropriate construal (moral
or otherwise) may be one of the most important aspects of moral
or ethical decision-making [86]. The failure, for example, to
consider the pragmatic implications of certain decisions could lead
to unnecessarily swift or extreme decisions. Conversely, the failure
to consider the moral implications of one’s actions may ultimately
lead people to act immorally in pursuit of pragmatic ends [87].
Future research should continue to investigate why people
evaluate certain actions in moral terms as opposed to analyzing
their pros and cons or considering their hedonic value.
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